- openDemocracy

FEATURED STORY

After Maduro, there is a storm brewing in Venezuela

If successive presidents of the United States once claimed to spread freedom and defend democracy to justify propping up dictators, bombing faraway lands and invading countries, the current administration has made no such excuses.

Last week, US security forces abducted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife from a compound in Caracas and presented both in a Manhattan courtroom on charges of drug smuggling.

Yet in subsequent interviews with several US news outlets, US President Donald Trump made clear that the reason for this unprecedented, and likely illegal, military action was to commandeer Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.

While decades of international realpolitik have invariably involved removing an adversary and installing a friendly, internationally accepted opposition leader in their place, the Trump administration has sidelined Venezuela’s beleaguered opposition of María Corina Machado (who just won the Nobel Peace Prize that Trump has long coveted) and Edmundo González Urrutia, and installed Maduro’s deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, as acting president.

Laura Tedesco is a long-time openDemocracy contributor and a professor of Latin American politics and international relations at St. Louis University Madrid. She spoke to openDemocracy soon after US secretary of state Marco Rubio presented a three-part plan to seize Venezuelan oil. A plan that US opposition leaders say amounts to theft.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity. (You can also listen to this interview as a podcast on Spotify, Apple, or your desktop.)

Aman Sethi: In all the scenario-planning around Venezuela in the months since the US military build-up in the Caribbean, is it fair to say no one saw this particular scenario, where the US has essentially removed President Maduro, but left the regime completely intact to the extent of appointing his deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, as the new leader?

Laura Tedesco: I think this was a big surprise. When we were watching [the news] on TV, we were all thinking that afterwards [the US] will bring María Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez to the government, but that would also be a little bit naive.

Naive in the sense that [the opposition] are extremely alone. I think we were all surprised, taken by surprise.

Was Rodríguez someone that those tracking were like, “This person is definitely on my radar?”

I don't think that academics familiar with the Venezuelan regime were expecting her to be chosen to replace Maduro, really. She's part of the regime.

When Hugo Chávez [Maduro’s predecessor] arrived in government, he created not really a political party, but a social movement at the city-level and in the small town-level that is very, very loyal to the regime.

They work for the regime, they distribute food and other things to the people. And they are, you know, they are in charge of the small towns. They do a lot of social work. But they are also the intelligence.

So these are people who know a lot about the social structure of Venezuela. And so in this sense, they were very useful. When you establish such an authoritarian regime, you know that you are controlling every aspect of everyday life. So Rodríguez was taken from here.

So, as I understand it, when Hugo Chávez took power in 1999, he essentially built a kind of parallel social structure that is national and works at a very grassroots level.

Exactly, yes.

So if we were to give Trump the benefit of doubt for a minute, it suggests that if you were going to engineer some version of leadership change in Venezuela – even if it is patently illegal – actually trying to install an opposition regime would be almost like a recipe for civil war?

Yes. The one who is in power needs to control the armed forces. And if you call Edmundo [González Urrutia] or María Corina Machado, how are you going to control the armed forces? How are you going to control all the Cubans? Who will work with the armed forces or in hospitals? Who knows the Venezuelan state? Delcy Rodríguez knows.

And I'm sure she's willing to help because I'm sure either they're going to give her a big economic prize, or they're going to tell her that she won’t end up in jail. And so she's going to collaborate. She doesn't have any other option, really.

So far, you have repeatedly said it all depends on the army. What role do the armed forces play in Venezuelan politics and society?

The Army is the main pillar of the regime. Chávez was from the army and he had all the support of the army. Maduro was not from the armed forces, but he also had their support.

This was a military dictatorship. Like the one in Cuba. Right. And after the invasion from Trump on 3 January, I was surprised and even angry, you know, that he decided to put, uh, Delcy Rodríguez, but then you, you start to understand he couldn't move away everyone from the regime and install Edmundo Gonzalez or María Corina Machado, that was impossible.

So they have to now work with the armed forces. And, uh, when, when I say we have to work with the armed forces, we have to give them something because they have the weapons and the armed forces is the only institution that has the infrastructure in every corner of the country.

So you have to work with them.

• Keep openDemocracy free to read for everyone
• Provide our team with the support they need to work safely in a dangerous world
• Deliver the reporting that matters to you – and that reaches as many people as possible

MORE FROM OPENDEMOCRACY