Since his campaign for office in 2023, President Tinubu has been dogged by accusations of being embroiled in an investigation by US law enforcement agencies for alleged drug trafficking. While he continues to deny this, these allegations make him susceptible to US pressure.

Nigeria has also not had any ambassadors since September 2023, when it recalled all of its diplomats around the world with immediate effect. This reduces its ability to effectively engage with governments, and is now a particular problem in the US, where ambassadors could help with negotiating new trade or bilateral agreements and liaising with lobbying groups to manage tariffs, as well as leveraging connections and appealing to key insiders within the Trump White House.

Although there are valid reasons why Nigeria should reject the US president, there are valid, potential downsides to doing so, too.

His administration has made an example of South Africa in recent months, showing how it is prepared to act against countries it sees as “un-American”. Trump has expelled South Africa’s ambassador, ambushed its president during an Oval Office meeting, denied its special envoy a diplomatic visa, threatened to boycott the G20 summit in Johannesburg in November, and announced it will impose a 30% tariff, which the governor of South Africa’s central bank estimates will put 100,000 jobs at risk. His cabinet appointees have also shunned meetings with South African foreign and finance ministers, while last month the US took in Afrikaner refugees and spread a hoax about a ‘white genocide’.

South Africa has so far weathered the storm, but this could change after the new US tariff comes into effect on 1 August. In any case, Nigeria may not be able to withstand a similar barrage, having recently introduced market reforms to stabilise the Naira, which have unduly affected poorer citizens. The World Bank estimates that as of April 2025, 56% of Nigerians live below the poverty line.

While Nigeria’s inflation has reduced, in part due to a rebase of the GDP, there are still prevalent cost of living issues that will require more policies and investment. The Nigerian government was forced to allocate $200m to the health sector after the USAID cuts, but a targeted US onslaught could force an end to programs such as intelligence sharing, with widespread ramifications for ongoing work. Higher US tariffs and a diplomatic stand-off would also affect Nigeria’s oil and gas trade with the US – one of its largest trading partners – further worsening its economic fortunes, while being caught in the crosshairs of a major power like the US would do little to assure foreign direct investment from elsewhere.

Nigeria, ultimately, cannot hold off Trump alone; a coordinated continental response is needed. Nigeria must use its considerable diplomatic weight to push for an African Union-led framework to counter the US’s deportation demands. This will involve addressing Eswatini and South Sudan, which have already accepted US deportees, as well as Angola, Rwanda, Benin, Equatorial Guinea and Libya, which the Trump administration is lobbying to do so. To achieve this, Nigeria will need to be more proactive with diplomatic engagement, including promptly appointing new ambassadors who are experienced, rather than politically motivated.

Nigeria also needs to ensure it is in sync with other African BRICS+ members and partners – South Africa, Egypt and Ethiopia – affected by Trump’s push against the intergovernmental grouping. Particularly key to their collaboration is giving life to an African free trade agreement (AfCFTA), which was signed into law in 2018 to unite all 55 African Union nations into a single market, but has faced significant implementation challenges and slow progress.

AfCFTA aimed to help wean African countries away from trade dependence on foreign countries – the importance of which has been made clear by the Trump tariffs – as well as boosting domestic economies, creating new manufacturing hubs and enabling states to invest in building their logistics and transportation capacities.

The agreement’s false start reflects the limitations of African collaboration: most states are prepared to give up their leverage over foreign powers for short-term gain at the expense of long-term independence. This dilemma highlights the issues with standing up to a major power and requires the more established economies to lead this pivot.

The risk of failing to get a wider consensus across Africa is far more than just diplomatic and economic: it’s also practical. The nature of contiguous and often porous borders is that neighbouring states are affected by the policy of another. Standing up to the US is not just a matter of Pan-African solidarity; it also makes sense to Nigeria and other countries from a domestic perspective.

Afolabi Adekaiyaoja is a research analyst and a writer on the politics of policy, institutions, and governance