In the end, the US decided against an attack on Iran. But now, with the Israeli assault underway, has the situation changed substantially in the past couple of decades? Or will Iran’s response to Israel’s latest attacks be the same as I predicted in 2006, leading to a long, drawn-out confrontation?
It’s worth considering that the Oxford Research Group report was written in the context of a potential attack by the US, not Israel. While Israel’s conduct in Gaza is making it an international pariah, in terms of a conflict with Iran, it is in a stronger position than the US was in 2006.
Back then, Iranian-backed militias were becoming more significant in the Iraq War and Hezbollah was stronger than it is today in southern Lebanon. Both were more likely to intervene in the case of a US attack than they are today. And in the present day, Iran’s air defences have been weakened by recent Israeli air strikes, and Iran’s domestic economy is struggling against extensive US-led sanctions and its government is unlikely to be able to spend as much on counter-attacks against Iran as it would like.
It’s true that the Houthis in Yemen are causing some problems for Israel as they support the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank by launching missiles against Israeli territory. But Netanyahu knows full well that if Houthis took any seriously damaging response to Israeli actions in Iran, the US and the UK would react by stepping up their anti-Houthi air strikes in support of Israel.
There is one major uncertainty for Israel, though: whether Iran really has been able to construct the most important parts of its nuclear programme sufficiently deep underground to protect them from an Israeli air attack. So far, a spokesperson for Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation has said that the majority of the damage from Israeli air strikes targeting its underground Natanz uranium enrichment facility has been at surface level.
Whether this continues to be the case may be determined by whether the US decides to supply the Israeli Defence Forces with its most powerful “bunker-busting” bombs or even join Israel in the conflict.
Israel’s primary aim will be to set back the Iranian nuclear ambitions for as long as possible, preferably up to five or even ten years. That goes far beyond damaging the core physical elements of the programme to destroying the knowledge base of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
As such, Israel will be planning to kill the people who make up the programme, from senior scientists and engineers right through to young technicians and even the people who train them. That plan is already underway, and will also involve attacking any government facility directly or even indirectly involved with the nuclear programme, including the university and college staff who would train the new generations of nuclear industry workers needed to replace those killed.
Beyond that, Iran may attempt to close the Straits of Hormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and also damage oil and gas production facilities in the region, aiming to cause substantial increases in energy prices. One factor that is often overlooked is that 20 years ago, the US was substantially dependent on imported energy supplies. That has changed in the past two decades, as it has increased its reliance on oil and gas by much more use of fracking. Even as the world faces uncertain times, this will make it easier for the US to remain firm in its support for Israel.
The Israeli prime minister has made it abundantly clear that these first attacks are just an initial step in what will be a long operation. As my ORG report from 2006 put it: “A military operation against Iran would not, therefore, be a short-term matter but would set in motion a complex and long-lasting confrontation.” That remains the case as much now as it did then.
